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FACULTY COMMENT
WEAPONS REGULATION, MILITARY NECESSITY AND
LEGAL STANDARDS: ARE CONTEMPORARY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE "PRACTICES"
INCONSISTENT WITH LEGAL NORMS?
JORDAN J. PAUST*
Editors Note:
On January 18, 1974, Leonard Niederlehner, Acting General Counsel
of the Department of Defense, responded to Representative Donald M.
Fraser's letter of November 14, 1973, concerning the "appropriateness
under international law of the M-16 rifle. "' In that response, which ad-
dressed itself to the propriety of the M-16, Mr. Niederlehner cited as
authority paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV.,
which provides, in part, that it is forbidden "to employ arms, projectiles,
or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering .. "The follow-
ing article is a comment on Mr. Niederlehner's interpretation of that
language.
Pentagon representatives have recently marie statements about
the law and legal criteria utilized for decisions concerning the legality
of weapon systems or their actual use in a particular context which
do not adequately reflect previous U.S. or international legal stan-
dards. Whether there has been an inadvertent use of ambiguous
words, a deliberate attempt to shift the standard, or something in
between these two poles of subjectivity, is not known.
What is readily discoverable, however, is that recent Pentagon
statements to the House Subcommittee on International Organiza-
tions and Movements are inconsistent with a complete map of U.S.
and international legal policies as reflected in the authoritative U.S.
Army Field Manual, The Law of Land Warfare.' And what is at stake
in this inquiry is not merely the inconsistency, but the dangers to a
proper serving of legal policy through use of the phrases disclosed
below. On the one hand, there is a danger that acceptance of these
phrases will contribute to a wider use of violence, death and destruc-
tion. And on the other, there is a danger that certain phrases may
push the subjective standard of criminal culpability to an extreme
* Associate Professor, designate, University of Houston; J.S.D. Candidate, Yale.
1. Department of Defense, OSD Corres. 17018. Pertinent excerpts of Mr.
Niederlehner's letter can be found in Rovine, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating To International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 504, 528-30 (1974).
2. U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956)
[hereinafter cited as FM 27-10].
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level of specific intent to do something which is unnecessary-an
intent which has never been the threshold and which, if adopted as
the level of criminal culpability, could substantially thwart efforts to
discipline soldiers or sanction violations of the law.
Here, several statements and implications contained in Mr.
Niederlehner's letter to Representative Fraser, Chairperson of the
House Subcommittee, about the "appropriateness under interna-
tional law of the M-16 rifle ' 3 are used as a focus. There is no attempt
to refute Mr. Niederlehner's conclusions about the legality, per se, of
the M-16, since no detailed analysis of relevant legal policies and
ballistics and medical effects has been completed by the Department
of Defense.' His letter is merely used as a widely publicized example
of recent Pentagon thinking about weapons regulation, and com-
ments on his actual or inferable misstatements of law are offered to
avoid a public confusion in regard to actual U.S. and international
legal standards.
The first discrepancy involves subjective standards and criminal
culpability. Mr. Niederlehner states that the phrase "calculated to
cause," as contained in the English version of Article 23(e) of the
Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV (1907), will place within the
content of the prohibition of the use of weapons which cause "unnec-
essary suffering" some "element of intent." 5 This is an erroneous
interpretation if, by that, Mr. Niederlehner means to create some
new "element of intent" beyond an intent to do an act which causes
unncessary death, destruction, injury or suffering in a circumstance
where one of "reasonable" make-up could reasonably foresee that
such an act could cause such a death or injurious outcome.
It is by no means clear what Mr. Niederlehner actually meant.
He qualifies his requirement of an "element of intent" with the fol-
lowing language: "such that members of the Armed Forces cannot
justify the use of weapons inconsistent with attaining a legitimate
military objective." 6 But even this language is insufficient for clarity.
One does not know whether he subscribes to a mens rea standard of
the "calculated to cause" or "inconsistent with" variety This writer
feels that something in between the two is the proper test, and it
hinges upon the proverbial "reasonable man" and the actual condi-
3. See Rovine, supra note 1, at 528-30.
4. In regard to possible illegality see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
(ICRC), REPORT ON THE WORK OF EXPERTS ON WEAPONS THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY
SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as ICRC REPORT
OF EXPERTS].
5. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529.
6. Id.
7. See also id. ("intentionally superfluous").
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tions of decision.8 What is clear, however, is that no higher subjective
standard (i.e., commission of an act or adoption of a weapon system
"calculated" to cause unnecessary injury or which is "intentionally
superfluous") is contained in this prescription.
The French text of the 1907 Hague prohibition does not contain
the word "calculated," and the French wording is the only authorita-
tive wording.' The French text, moreover, retained the exact wording
of the earlier 1899 Hague Convention No. H, Annex, Article 23(e)
prohibition. The relevant language is as follows: ". . . of a nature to
cause superfluous injury" (" . . . propres a causer des maux super-
flus"). Custom has also retained the original meaning and text-
writers now merely refer to the principle of unnecessary suffering. 0
This writer feels, however, that although weapon illegality must sub-
stantially hinge upon effects, not upon subjectivities, a criminal pros-
ecution for design, adoption or use of illegal weapons must address
the common mens rea standard of culpability which is based upon a
"reasonable man," foreseeability and actual circumstance. But Mr.
Niederlehner is plainly wrong if it is his contention that Article 23(e)
has been violated only when a weapon or conduct causes suffering or
injury which is "intentionally superfluous."" Since he uses this lan-
guage along with an exposition of the postulated "element of intent"
theory, one must infer that it is his standard and, then, denounce it
as unsupportable by proper legal analysis.
There is another misstatement of law implied in Mr.
Niederlehner's letter. It is the implication that the Department of
Defense now subscribes to the repudiated "Kriegsraison" theory of
the German war criminals. At the outset it must be emphasized that
it has never been an accepted international legal standard in modern
times that armed forces can employ any form or intensity of violence
which is consistent with or helpful in the attainment of a legitimate
military objective. Such an approach is far too broad. It amounts to
a military "benefit" test as opposed to a military "necessity" test, 2
and the military benefit or "Kriegsraison" theory was expressly repu-
8. See Paust, The Nuclear Decision in World War II-Truman's Ending and
Avoidance of War, 8 INT'L LAW. 160 (1974).
9. See FM 27-10, supra note 2, at i.
10. See ICRC REPoRT oi EXPERTS, supra note 4, at 14, para. 21; and infra note
11.
11. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529. For a contrary DOD/DA view see FM 27-10, supra
note 2, at 3 (paras. 2a and 3a), 18 (paras. 34b and 36), 19-20 (para. 41) and 23-24 (para.
56); see also id. at 178 (para. 501) and 182 (para. 509).
12. See Paust, supra note 8, at 163-66, 168-69 n.31; Comment, 26 NAVAL WAR
COLL. REV. 103 (1973); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader
Responsibility, 57 MIL. L. REv. 99, 149-53 (1972). See also the remarks of Aldrich in
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 148
(1973); the remarks of Paust, id. at 162; the remarks of Rubin, id. at 165.
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diated at Nuremberg in the Von Leeb case.13 One could infer that Mr.
Niederlehner adopts the military benefit test through use of the
phrase "use of weapons inconsistent with attaining a legitimate mili-
tary objective" by implying that he feels that any weapon usage
which is merely consistent with attaining a legitimate military objec-
tive would be lawful. But it is not clear that he subscribes to such an
implication, although, for clarity, such an implication must be em-
phatically denounced.
What is also disturbing, however, is that this sort of implication
(of a new DOD "Kriegstaison" theory) seems consistent with recent
statements made before the same Congressional body by Major Gen-
eral George Prugh, the Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army. General
Prugh stated that "loss of life and damage to property must not be
out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained" (emphasis
added)." Actually, the rule is that loss of life must not be out of
proportion to what is militarily "necessary" under the circumstances,
and damage to property must not be out of proportion to what is
"imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."' 5 Although it is
true that General Prugh's words reflect a partial reading of paragraph
41 of the U.S. Army Field Manual,'" that paragraph also reiterates
the "necessity" test through the phrase: "demanded by the exigen-
cies of war," and paragraph 3 of the Army manual makes it clear that
the military benefit or "advantage" test is not the legal standard.
That paragraph states that the law of war "requires that belligerents
refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes. . ." (emphasis added). The
same paragraph states that military necessity also involves the use
of measures "which are indispensable for securing the complete sub-
mission of the enemy as soon as possible" (emphasis added). In re-
gard to property, "[tihe measure of permissible devastation is found
in the strict necessities of war."' 7 It is clearly not enough that the
measure is advantageous to, beneficial to or consistent with military
needs. The test is "necessity," not "Kriegsraison."
Another implication in Mr. Niederlehner's letter is that the pro-
hibition of "dum-dum" bullets only applies to bullets which are not
13. See also Ul U.S. DEPT. OF THE AaRMy, PAMPHLEr No. 27-161-2, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 248 (1962), quoting from United States v. Von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
541 (1948) and rejecting the "right to do anything that contributes to the winning of a
war."
14. Statement of Major General Prugh, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l.
Organization and Movements of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 102 (1974).
15. See FM 27-10, supra note 2, at 3 (para. 3a), 19 (para. 41), 23 (para. 56) and
24 (para. 58).
16. Id. at 19.
17. Id. at 23 (para. 56) (emphasis added). See also id. at 24 (para. 58).
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"fully jacketed.""8 Such an implication would also be clearly erro-
neous, since the very purpose of the customary 1899 Declaration on
Expanding Bullets 9 was to prohibit certain effects of any bullet
within the human body and not merely certain specific configurations
of bullets. 0 That declaration prohibited "bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope
which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions."',
The listing of partially-jacketed bullets and bullets pierced with inci-
sions was merely illustrative. Moreover, it is clear that the proscribed
effects can be caused by partial-jacketing, a flat top (bullet tip),
cutting off of the tip of a bullet, scoring the surface of the jacket, a
hollow-point, soft lead, a weak jacketing and/or a tremendous in-
crease in velocity. 22 As the Army Field Manual sets forth, usage has
established the illegality of "irregular-shaped bullets . . . and the
scoring of the surface or the filing off of the ends of the hard cases of
bullets." More recent Army publications reiterate these prohibi-
tions. Army Subject Schedule No. 27-1 states that these principles
"have established the illegality of the use of irregular-shaped bullets
such as dum-dum bullets...",u And Department of the Army Pam-
phlet No. 27-200 states:
. . . irregular shaped bullets (dum-dum) and projectiles filled with glass
are examples of weapons considered to be illegal per se; that is, they may
never be used ... Misuse of a legitimate weapon, such as cutting of the
points of issued ammunition, is a violation of the law of war."
An older United States Naval War Code (1900) had also declared
that:
it is forbidden . . . (2) To employ arms, projectiles, or materials calcu-
lated to cause unnecessary suffering. Entering especially into this cate-
gory are . . . bullets with a hard envelope which does not cover the core
entirely or is pierced with incisions.
2
18. See Rovine, supra note 1, at 529, "The M-16 projectile is fully-jacketed and
does not, therefore, violate the prohibition on 'dum-dum' bullets."
19. Declaration on Expanding Bullets, Dec. IV, 3, July 29, 1899, Reprinted at 1
AM. J. INT'L L. 155 (Supp. 1907).
20. See, e.g., Paust, Does Your Police Force Use Illegal Weapons?-An Approach
to Decision-Making A bout Weapons Regulations, (forthcoming article); ICRC REPORT
OF EXPERTS, supra note 4. See also Connecticut Civil Liberties Union News Release,
July 26, 1974; Controversy Swirls Over Use of Bullet, The Middletown Press (Connecti-
cut) Aug. 3, 1974, at 1; The First DumDum Use Stirs Connecticut Controversy, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1974 at 33, col. 1.
21. Declaration, supra note 19.
22. See supra note 14; FM 27-10, supra note 2, at 18 (para. 34b); U.S. Dept. of
the Army, Pamphlet No. 27-161-2, supra note 13, at 45.
23. FM 27-10, supra note 2, at para. 34.
24. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Convention No. IV. of 1907, at 6
(1970) (unpublished material).
25. The Law of Land Warfare-A Self Instructional Text 5 (1972) (unpublished
material).
26. See VI G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 455 (1943).
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The U.S. position at the 1899 Hague Conference was that it should
be forbidden to use "bullets inflicting wounds of useless cruelty, such
as explosive bullets, and in general all kinds of bullets which exceed
the limit necessary for placing a man hors de combat... , but the
U.S. position was not adopted by the Conference." What was clearly
adopted, however, was a focus on the effects of bullets within the
human body rather than upon specific bullet configurations. More-
over, it is because of the basic prohibition of unnecessary suffering,
cruelty, torture, unusual injury, aggravation of wounds beyond what
is necessary, the rendering of death inevitable and other such out-
comes that legal guidance in this matter must necessarily consider an
interrelated set of norms that are generally referred to as human
rights.
. A fundamental norm of human rights which is relevant to this
sort of inquiry is Article 5 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.2 It states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." This prohibition
applies in time of armed conflict or in time of relative peace-through
all levels of human violence and circumstanices of state or public need
and military necessity. Moreover, the fundamental prohibition con-
tained in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration significantly matches
the legal policies that are articulated in Geneva law. Common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, applicable in time of an internal
armed conflict, also prohibits summary execution (the denial of a
right to a fair trial), inhumane treatment, murder, mutilation, tor-
ture, and cruel treatment. 0 To the extent that these policies are
relevant in any given inquiry into the legality of a weapon system or
weapon usage, they should be considered by legal decision-makers so
as to maximize the serving of legal policy. And these legal policies are
certainly going to be relevant in most cases. In regard to norms con-
tained in the law of war, the author agrees with Mr. Niederlehner that
these norms apply to "all weapons" and all bullets, and that the U.S.
is bound by each of these norms.
On a related matter, I also feel that Mr. Niederlehner's letter
about the effects of the U.S. M-16 and the Soviet AK-47 is unduly
kind to the Soviet Union's position. It is alleged, prior to completion
27. This was General Crozier's amendment. See Davis, Amelioration of the Rules
of War on Land, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 75, 75-77 (1908). The U. S. and Great Britain also
expressly intimated accession to the 1899 Declaration during the 1907 Hague Confer-
ence. See J. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 79 (1911); A. HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES 495-97 (1909). See also supra note 18.
28. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-161-2, supra note 13, at 44.
29. U.N. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
30. See, e.g., 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T 3516 (1955). See also J. BOND, THE RULES
OF RIOT-INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF WAR (1974).
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of comprehensive tests, that "the lethality-or wounding impact-of
the [M-161 does not differ from weapons such as the Soviet Union's
AK-47." '3' It is also stated that the "wounds inflicted" are "not sub-
stantially different." However, the International Committee of the
Red Cross report of experts discloses the fact that although the muz-
zle velocity of the Soviet AK-47 projectile is slower than that of the
U.S. M-16, the kinetic energy is much greater for the Soviet projec-
tile.32 Since the Soviet AK-47 projectile has almost 23 percent more
energy for transfer to the human body, it seems that it can cause
greater death, injury and suffering. Thus, it would seem to differ from
the U.S. M-16 projectile in terms of effects within the human body.
But actual tests may prove that although the Soviet AK-47 has more
energy for transfer it actually transfers about the same amount of
energy to the body as the M-16. We await further tests.
In conclusion, what should be stressed is that the test for permis-
sibility or impermissibility in regard to a weapon system or a weapon
usage hinges upon military "necessity" and not some "benefit,"
"advantage," "consistency" or "Kriegsraison" theory. Since I do not
seriously believe that there has been a change in U.S. or DOD policy,
or that Mr. Niederlehner's letter fairly expresses that policy, I con-
tinue to regard as violative of international law the employment of
"any kind or degree of violence which is not actually necessary for
military purposes..."3
31. Rovine, supra note 1, at 529.
32. See ICRC REPORT OF ExPERTs, supra note 4, at 42 (Table III.1 Ballistic fea-
tures). The muzzle velocity of the AK-47 is 720 m/sec., and that of the M-16 is 980
m/sec. But the kinetic energy for transfer to the body is 2100 for the AK-47 at point of
release and 1700 for the M-16 at point of release; or 1600 for the AK-47 at 100 meters
and 1300 for the M-16 at 100 meters. Thus, the AK-47 has over 23 percent more kinetic
energy for transfer.
33. FM 27-10, supra note 2, at para. 3a.
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